SCOTUS arguments made clear

Internet service providers like Cox Communications connect millions of Americans to the digital world, but what happens when their customers use that connection for illegal piracy? Cox was hit with a billion-dollar verdict for not terminating accounts of repeat copyright infringers. The Supreme Court must now decide the line between providing a neutral service and illegally contributing to copyright theft. Is an ISP liable just for knowing its service is used for infringement and failing to stop it, or must it show a specific purpose to encourage piracy? Cox argues it cannot be held liable for user misconduct without proof it actively fostered the infringement. Sony Music contends that knowingly providing the essential tool for piracy to habitual offenders makes Cox an accomplice. This decision will determine whether ISPs become the internet's copyright police, with the power to cut off service, or if creators will lose a key tool in the fight against online piracy.

An asylum seeker from El Salvador received credible death threats, but an immigration judge ruled this wasn't severe enough to count as legal 'persecution.' This case asks who gets the final say on that judgment. The Supreme Court must decide whether federal courts should defer to the immigration agency’s decision, or if they can review the case from scratch, known as de novo review. The petitioner argues that applying the legal term 'persecution' to a set of facts is a question of law that judges must decide independently to create consistent legal standards. The government counters that this is a fact-intensive judgment, requiring the weighing of evidence, and that courts should defer to the agency's expertise. The ruling will determine the power of federal courts to override immigration authorities in life-or-death asylum cases. It will either make it harder for asylum seekers to challenge denials in court or give them a fresh chance before a federal judge.

A federal judge, plagued by "disquiet" over a jury's verdict that sent a man to prison for life, used a compassionate release law years later to reduce his sentence. The Supreme Court must now decide if this law, intended as a safety valve for "extraordinary and compelling reasons," can be used to address claims of trial errors or potential innocence, or if those arguments belong exclusively to the much stricter *habeas corpus* process. During arguments, the prisoner's attorney contended that the statute’s broad text does not limit the types of reasons a judge can consider, allowing for a remedy when the system creates a profound injustice. The government countered that this interpretation would create an end-run around the strict procedural deadlines Congress placed on habeas petitions, turning compassionate release into a loophole for endless legal challenges. Justices across the ideological spectrum worried this would undermine the finality of criminal sentences. A ruling for Fernandez could open a new path for prisoners to seek sentence reductions based on legal claims that are otherwise barred from review. A ruling for the government would maintain a firm wall between compassionate release—reserving it for personal circumstances like terminal illness—and the formal process for challenging the validity of a conviction.

A man is serving a decades-long sentence for armed robbery that would be significantly shorter if imposed today under the First Step Act of 2018. The Supreme Court is now deciding whether federal judges, when considering "compassionate release," can count such a sentencing disparity as an "extraordinary and compelling reason" for a reduction, even though Congress explicitly chose not to make the new law retroactive. The inmate’s attorneys argued that the compassionate release statute gives judges broad discretion to consider the "totality of the circumstances." They stressed that the U.S. Sentencing Commission, which Congress authorized to set the rules, permits considering these disparities as one factor among many. The government countered that this allows judges and an administrative agency to effectively override a direct policy judgment by Congress. Several justices expressed concern that this would create a form of "judicial parole," undermining sentences lawmakers intended to be final. If the Court sides with the inmate, thousands of people serving lengthy sentences under old laws could seek reductions based on more lenient modern standards. If it sides with the government, they must complete sentences that Congress has since deemed excessively long for the same crimes.

When prison guards forcibly shaved a Louisiana inmate’s head in violation of his religious beliefs, it raised a critical question: can individual government employees be forced to pay damages for such an act? The Supreme Court weighed whether the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) allows individuals to sue state officials in their personal capacity for money damages. This law uses Congress’s power to attach conditions to federal funding. The inmate’s lawyer argued that RLUIPA’s text authorizing suits against officials for “appropriate relief” clearly includes damages, the only meaningful remedy for a one-time violation. The state countered that this stretches Congress's federal funding power too far, as individual guards never signed a contract with the federal government or consented to personal liability. The justices explored whether this theory could expose a wide range of state employees, from coaches to doctors, to new forms of federal lawsuits. The ruling will determine whether people in prisons, hospitals, or other federally funded institutions can sue individual officials for financial compensation when their religious freedoms are violated, defining the line between federal power and state employees’ personal accountability.

When a private company running an immigration detention center for the U.S. government was sued by detainees for forced labor, it argued the case should be dismissed because it was just following federal orders. The trial court disagreed, and the company wanted to appeal that decision immediately. The Supreme Court is now deciding whether government contractors can pause a lawsuit to appeal a denial of "derivative sovereign immunity," or if they must endure a full trial first. This case tests the limits of the collateral-order doctrine, a rule allowing immediate appeals for issues like immunity from suit. GEO Group argued that its protection is a true immunity, necessary to prevent lawsuits from disrupting vital government functions and discouraging companies from public service. The detainees, supported by the U.S. government, countered that this is merely a defense against liability, not a right to avoid trial altogether, and is too fact-intensive to be decided separately from the main case. Justices repeatedly pressed the company on why the government, whose interests it claims to protect, was arguing against it. A ruling for GEO Group would grant thousands of private contractors a powerful tool to delay or defeat lawsuits before a trial. A loss would mean contractors must defend themselves through the entire litigation process before appealing, ensuring plaintiffs get their day in court but potentially increasing costs for government services.

After President Trump imposed sweeping tariffs on global imports by declaring a national emergency, the Supreme Court weighed whether he had the authority to do so. The case hinges on whether the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), a 1977 law designed for sanctions, also grants the president the power to set tariffs—a form of tax the Constitution gives to Congress. The government argued the law’s phrase “regulate importation” is broad enough to include tariffs, a classic and flexible tool of foreign policy. Challengers countered that Congress never delegates its core taxing power implicitly, warning that the government’s reading creates a “one-way ratchet,” giving presidents a permanent, unchecked economic tool. Justices questioned whether Congress could ever reclaim such a vast power once it was given away. The ruling will determine whether the president can unilaterally reshape the economy by declaring a foreign-facing emergency, or if the power to set taxes on goods remains firmly with Congress. A decision for the government would grant future presidents a potent tool to bypass lawmakers on major economic issues, from trade deficits to climate change.

A family sued baby food maker Hain Celestial and grocer Whole Foods in Texas state court. Hain, an out-of-state company, moved the case to federal court, arguing the local grocer was only added to block this move—a tactic called "fraudulent joinder." A federal judge agreed, dismissed Whole Foods, and Hain later won at trial. After an appeals court found that dismissal was a mistake, the Supreme Court must decide if the verdict must be thrown out because the case was improperly in federal court from the start. Hain argued for finality, contending that since only parties from different states remained at the trial's end, the court had proper jurisdiction. It claimed erasing a full trial over an early error would be a colossal waste. The family countered that jurisdiction cannot be created by a court's mistake and being wrongly denied their chosen state court is a fundamental harm. Justices questioned whether jurisdiction was ever truly "cured" while the dismissed party was "lurking," ready to be reinstated on appeal. A ruling for Hain would make it easier for companies to move cases to federal court, knowing a favorable verdict might survive even a legally flawed removal. A ruling for the family would reinforce a plaintiff's power to keep their case in local court, forcing companies to be certain of their legal grounds or risk having a federal victory erased.

A company was hit with a default judgment—an automatic loss for not appearing in court. Years later, when a creditor tried to seize its bank account, the company fought back, claiming the original court never had the power to hear the case against them. The Supreme Court is now deciding whether there is any time limit to challenge a judgment that is claimed to be "void" from the start. A federal rule says such challenges must be made within a "reasonable time," but the question is whether that limit applies to a judgment that was arguably a legal nullity from its inception. During arguments, the company contended that a void judgment is a due process violation that cannot be made valid by the mere passage of time. The creditor countered that the rule’s text is clear: “reasonable time” means there is always a deadline, providing certainty and finality to the legal process. Justices questioned both sides, probing whether an infinite window to challenge judgments would create chaos, and conversely, whether closing that window could force someone to pay a debt from a case they never had a fair chance to fight. This ruling will determine the shelf life of default judgments. If the Court finds there is no time limit, anyone holding a default judgment could see it erased years or even decades later. If the Court rules that a "reasonable time" limit applies, individuals and businesses will be required to act promptly to object to a court's power, or risk losing their right to challenge it forever.

A woman on post-prison supervision disappeared from her probation officer’s watch. Years after her supervision was scheduled to end, she committed a new crime. The government now seeks to punish her not just for that crime, but also for violating the terms of her original release—a move only possible if the clock on her supervision was secretly paused the entire time she was missing. At the Supreme Court, the justices wrestled with whether the "fugitive-tolling doctrine"—a rule that stops the clock on a sentence when someone absconds—applies to supervised release. The government argued it’s common sense: a person cannot serve a term of *supervised* release if they aren’t actually being supervised. In response, the defendant’s lawyer argued Congress provided a different remedy: a judge can issue a warrant for the absconder and, once they are caught, revoke their release and send them back to prison. Several justices appeared skeptical of the government's position, questioning why the Court should create a tolling rule from "whole cloth" without a clear statute and highlighting the logical paradox of claiming someone is simultaneously "on" release (to violate its conditions) and "off" it (to stop the clock). This decision will define the limits of federal power over individuals after they leave prison. If the Court agrees with the government, anyone who absconds could have their supervision period extended indefinitely, facing harsher penalties for actions taken long after their original term was set to expire. If the Court sides with Rico, the government's authority is limited: it must issue a warrant before the term runs out to hold a person accountable for disappearing.

A deadly bombing at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan, carried out by an employee of a private military contractor, left U.S. Army Specialist Hencely severely injured. The Supreme Court considered whether private military contractors operating in a war zone are immune from state lawsuits for negligence. The central question is whether the federal government's exclusive power to wage war automatically shields contractors, even when they allegedly violate military orders and their government contract. Hencely’s attorney argued that under existing precedent (*Boyle*), contractors are only shielded when following specific government orders; otherwise, state negligence laws apply to protect soldiers from contractor misconduct. Fluor Corporation countered that any state lawsuit involving combat operations inherently interferes with the uniquely federal power to wage war. They argued that allowing state courts to judge actions on a foreign battlefield would create chaos and undermine military command, regardless of whether a contractor violated an order. A ruling for Hencely would mean that U.S. soldiers injured by a contractor's negligence in a war zone could sue for damages, holding companies financially accountable. A ruling for Fluor would grant these contractors broad immunity, similar to the military itself, leaving injured soldiers with no legal recourse against private firms, even for actions that violated military directives.

After a frantic 911 call reported that Trevor Case was threatening suicide, police entered his Montana home without a warrant and ultimately shot him. The Supreme Court considered what the Fourth Amendment requires for police to enter a home for an emergency wellness check. Does the "emergency-aid exception" demand "probable cause"—a substantial chance that someone is in immediate, life-threatening danger—or does a more flexible "objectively reasonable basis" suffice? Case’s lawyer argued that protecting the home requires the high bar of probable cause, which officers lacked given their history with his empty threats. Montana countered that a rigid probable cause standard, designed for criminal cases, would paralyze first responders from saving lives. Justices questioned whether a strict rule would cause deadly hesitation, while also worrying that a vague standard could lead to unnecessary and tragic home invasions, especially during mental health crises. The Court's decision will set the nationwide rules for wellness checks. A ruling for Case would strengthen privacy but could make police hesitate to intervene in ambiguous emergencies. A ruling for Montana would give officers more discretion to provide aid, but it could also increase the risk of violent encounters when police respond to people in crisis.

Decades after his conviction, a defendant is facing tougher rules for paying back his victim under a law passed after he committed his crime. The Supreme Court must now decide if this is constitutional. The case, *Ellingburg v. United States*, asks whether mandatory restitution—money a defendant pays a victim—is a criminal punishment. If it is, the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause forbids making it harsher retroactively. The defendant argued that restitution is clearly punishment because it’s part of a criminal sentence and backed by the threat of more jail time. An appointed amicus countered that restitution is a civil-style remedy designed to compensate victims, not punish offenders, noting its mandatory nature is based on victim loss, much like a civil damages award. If the Court deems restitution a punishment, Congress cannot apply tougher collection rules to old crimes. If it’s ruled civil, victims will have a better chance of being paid back, but it could create new constitutional questions about the right to a jury trial.

A federal prisoner seeking a second chance to challenge his conviction ran into a complex legal roadblock, forcing the Supreme Court to untangle a dense statutory puzzle. The justices weighed whether a rule that automatically dismisses repetitive claims from state prisoners also applies to federal prisoners. Before reaching that question, however, they first had to decide if they even have the power—or jurisdiction—to hear the case, or if Congress stripped them of that authority for these "second or successive" appeals. The prisoner’s attorney argued the law’s plain text distinguishes between state and federal inmates, and that any limit on the Court’s jurisdiction must be unmistakably clear, which he claimed this statute is not. The government countered that Congress designed a swift, final process that would be undermined by lengthy Supreme Court appeals. Several justices appeared skeptical of creating a procedural loophole, with Justice Alito asking if the prisoner's reading would “make a hash” of Congress's intent to promote finality. The ruling will determine the procedural hurdles for thousands of federal inmates seeking to challenge their sentences based on new evidence or law. A decision for the prisoner would preserve a path for these claims to reach the Supreme Court. A ruling for the government would effectively close the Court's doors to this entire class of cases, leaving conflicting legal rules in place across the country and affirming Congress's power to limit the Court's oversight.

Federal law sets one Election Day, but some states like Illinois count mail-in ballots arriving up to two weeks later. The Supreme Court considered a crucial gateway question: does a political candidate automatically have the right to sue over such rules? To enter federal court, a person must show a concrete injury, a requirement known as “standing.” This case asks if simply being a candidate is injury enough, or if they must first prove the rule creates a real risk of them losing. The candidate’s lawyers argued that changing election rules inherently harms all competitors and pointed to the financial cost of monitoring a longer vote count. Illinois countered that without a “substantial risk” of losing, a candidate’s complaint is an abstract grievance, and allowing such suits forces courts to become political oddsmakers. The decision will determine when election rules can be challenged. A ruling for the candidate would make it easier for any politician to sue over voting laws before an election. A ruling for the state would make challenges harder, likely pushing more legal fights into the chaotic post-election period for only the closest races.

When a landlord alleged that postal workers intentionally refused to deliver her mail as part of a harassment campaign, she ran into a federal law that generally shields the U.S. Postal Service from lawsuits over lost mail. The Supreme Court is now deciding whether that shield, which covers claims arising from the "loss" or "miscarriage" of mail, protects the USPS only from accidental mistakes or if it also immunizes it from lawsuits over intentional, malicious acts by its employees. The government argued that the terms "loss" and "miscarriage" broadly cover any failure of mail to arrive, warning that a narrow reading would invite a flood of lawsuits from anyone who could simply allege their late package was intentional. The landlord’s attorney countered that the law’s language points to accidents, not deliberate misconduct, and that the government's view would mean a postal worker could intentionally destroy a rent check or mail-in ballot with no legal recourse for the victim. The Court's decision will determine whether citizens can hold the Postal Service financially accountable for deliberate wrongdoing or if such claims are barred to protect the agency from potentially burdensome litigation.

A Colorado counselor is challenging a state law that forbids her from providing voluntary talk therapy to minors seeking to align their gender identity with their biological sex. The Supreme Court must now decide if this law is a permissible regulation of professional “conduct” or if it is unconstitutional censorship of “speech” that violates the First Amendment. The counselor argued that the law is clear viewpoint discrimination, permitting therapy that affirms a minor’s LGBTQ identity while banning therapy that explores a different path, even with parental consent. The state of Colorado countered that it is not regulating ideas but rather a harmful medical treatment that falls outside the established standard of care, much like it would regulate a dangerous surgical procedure. Several justices grilled the state on this logic, asking if a different state could then ban gender-affirming therapy by citing its own set of medical experts. A ruling for Colorado could grant states broad power to control conversations in the therapy room, while a ruling for the counselor would shield those private discussions as protected speech.

When a robbery ends in murder, can the government impose separate, consecutive prison sentences for both using a gun during the crime and for the killing itself? The Supreme Court weighed this question, which tests the Fifth Amendment’s protection against “double jeopardy,” or being punished twice for the same offense. At issue is whether using a firearm in a violent crime is a lesser, built-in component of committing murder with that same firearm. If so, the default rule is that a person can only be punished for the more serious crime unless Congress explicitly authorized punishing for both. The defendant—and, in a rare agreement, the U.S. government—argued that Congress never clearly authorized stacking these two punishments. However, a court-appointed attorney countered that other statutory language requiring sentences to be served consecutively makes Congress’s intent plain. Justices explored whether forbidding separate punishments could create an absurd result where a defendant who commits murder might face a lighter sentence than one who only brandishes a weapon. The ruling will clarify how explicitly Congress must write criminal laws to impose multiple punishments for a single criminal act. A decision for the defendant would strengthen protections against prosecutors “piling on” charges, while a decision against him would grant more leeway to impose longer, consecutive sentences for crimes that are part of the same violent episode.

A criminal defendant’s testimony is paused for an overnight recess, and the judge orders him not to discuss that testimony with his lawyer. The Supreme Court weighed whether such an order violates the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The case forces the Court to draw a line between a defendant's right to strategize with their attorney and a judge's power to prevent witness testimony from being improperly coached mid-trial. The defendant argued that banning discussion of testimony makes it impossible to give effective advice on critical matters like accepting a plea bargain or correcting honest mistakes. Texas countered that courts must protect the truth-seeking process by preventing testimony from being "managed" or "cleaned up" overnight. The state proposed a rule that distinguishes permissible strategic advice from impermissible coaching on the substance or delivery of testimony. A ruling for the defendant would grant clients and lawyers a clear right to discuss all aspects of testimony during long recesses. A ruling for Texas would give judges more power to restrict these conversations, aiming to preserve the integrity of cross-examination but creating a blurry and difficult-to-enforce line for defense attorneys, potentially chilling vital legal communication.

When a patient sued for medical malpractice over a foot injury, his case was stopped before it could begin. He ran into a Delaware law requiring that all such complaints be accompanied by a sworn statement from a medical expert confirming the case has merit. The Supreme Court is now deciding whether this state-level requirement can be enforced in federal courts, which have their own uniform rules for how lawsuits are filed. The patient’s lawyer argued that Delaware’s rule directly conflicts with the federal system’s core principle of “notice pleading,” where a case starts with a simple complaint and evidence is gathered later. Forcing a plaintiff to essentially prove their case before discovery begins, he claimed, fundamentally upends the federal process. Conversely, the doctor’s attorney contended the affidavit is a substantive part of Delaware’s malpractice law, not just a procedural hurdle, and is a valid tool for states to weed out frivolous lawsuits. The ruling will determine whether states can create special, front-loaded requirements for lawsuits filed in the federal system. A decision upholding the Delaware law could allow states to make it significantly harder and more expensive for individuals to bring claims, creating a patchwork of different procedural barriers across the nation’s federal courts.