Cox Communications v. Sony Music Entertainment
If an internet provider knows its customers are illegally downloading music, can it be sued for billions just for failing to cut off their service?
Sony Music Entertainment sued Cox Communications, an internet service provider, arguing Cox was responsible for its users' rampant and repeated illegal music downloads. A jury agreed, hitting Cox with a billion-dollar verdict because it had extensive knowledge of specific repeat infringers but did not terminate their accounts. The case asks the Supreme Court to decide where to draw the line between providing a neutral service and illegally contributing to copyright theft.
Sony argues that Cox knowingly provided the essential tool for piracy to habitual offenders, profited from their subscription fees, and had the power to stop the illegal activity simply by terminating the service. By maintaining this ongoing relationship despite thousands of notices, Sony contends that Cox's failure to act makes it an accomplice. Sony’s lawyer, Paul Clement, told the Court that when an ISP is 'substantially certain' infringement will continue from a specific account, it has the necessary 'intent' to be held liable for the resulting damages.
Cox counters that it provides a neutral, passive service, and it cannot be held liable for its customers' misconduct without proof that it actively encouraged or intended to promote piracy. During arguments, Cox's lawyer, E. Joshua Rosenkranz, told Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson that even if a customer explicitly stated their intent to infringe, Cox would not be liable for selling them service. Cox warns that a ruling for Sony would force ISPs to become 'internet police,' cutting off essential access for entire households, libraries, or universities based on mere accusations.
To be held responsible for user piracy, does an internet company have to want its users to infringe copyrights, or is it enough that it knows they are doing it?
The dispute between Cox Communications and Sony Music hinges on the mental state required to hold a company liable for its users' actions. Cox argues that to be guilty of 'contributory copyright infringement,' it must have acted with the specific purpose of promoting that piracy. Sony contends that it's enough that Cox knew its service was being used for massive infringement, was 'substantially certain' it would continue, and did nothing to stop it.
Cox's argument relies on a narrow view of accomplice liability, suggesting it requires active wrongdoing, not just a failure to act. They claim they are merely selling a neutral product that some people misuse. Justice Neil Gorsuch seemed to find this argument compelling, outlining a simple 'syllogism' for reversing the lower court: the narrowest liability standard requires 'purpose,' the jury was instructed based on mere 'knowledge,' and therefore the verdict cannot stand. This would allow the Court to rule for Cox without setting a definitive new standard.
Sony pushes back, arguing that traditional law defines 'intent' more broadly. If a company knows a result is 'substantially certain' to follow from its actions—like continuing to collect subscription fees from a known mass infringer—it legally 'intends' that result. Justice Sonia Sotomayor challenged Cox's 'laissez faire attitude,' suggesting that knowingly doing nothing while infringement occurs looks a lot like contributing to it. The Supreme Court must decide whether providing a service with full knowledge of its misuse constitutes passive assistance or active complicity.
Why would an internet provider follow federal rules to avoid copyright lawsuits if, as Cox Communications argues, it can't be sued for user infringement in the first place?
A federal law called the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) offers a 'safe harbor' to shield internet service providers (ISPs) from liability for their users' copyright infringement. To qualify for this protection, providers must follow certain rules, including adopting and implementing a policy to terminate the accounts of 'repeat infringers.' A central pillar of Cox's defense is that there is no underlying liability for failing to terminate infringers, regardless of the safe harbor.
This argument created a logical puzzle that several justices explored during the hearing. Justice Elena Kagan directly challenged Cox's lawyer on this point, asking why any company would bother complying with the DMCA's demanding rules to get into the safe harbor if there's no risk of being sued outside of it. She suggested that under Cox's theory, 'the safe harbor provision is not going to be doing anything at all,' effectively making it a pointless piece of legislation.
Sony Music seized on this, arguing that Cox's legal theory would render the DMCA's repeat infringer policy a 'dead letter.' Congress created the safe harbor as a bargain: ISPs get broad protection from lawsuits in exchange for cooperating with copyright holders to curb piracy. If the threat of liability for non-cooperation is removed, the entire incentive structure collapses. The Court must therefore consider whether to adopt a rule that, while potentially benefiting Cox, might undermine the entire statutory framework Congress designed to balance innovation and copyright protection online.
If music companies win their lawsuit, could internet providers be forced to terminate service to entire universities or libraries based on piracy by a single user?
Cox Communications warns that a ruling in favor of Sony Music would have 'cataclysmic' real-world consequences, forcing it and other internet service providers (ISPs) to become aggressive 'internet police.' The core of this fear relates to multi-user accounts, such as those serving universities, apartment buildings, public libraries, or even large families. Cox argues that if it can be held liable for billions simply for knowing about infringement and not acting, its only safe option would be to terminate accounts upon receiving accusations.
During oral arguments, Justice Samuel Alito raised this exact problem. He questioned the workability of Sony's proposed rule for large institutions, asking, 'What is an ISP supposed to do with a university account that has, let's say, 70,000 users?' The implication was that terminating essential internet access for an entire campus community because of the actions of a few students would be an unfair and disproportionate outcome.
This issue of collateral damage is a key practical concern for the justices. While Sony focuses on Cox's alleged tolerance of 'habitual abusers' on individual accounts, Cox broadens the frame to include these more complex scenarios. Any legal standard the Supreme Court sets must be workable not just for a single home WiFi connection but also for the vast, shared networks that are critical infrastructure for education, business, and public life.
Could a legal decision about online music piracy affect how platforms handle more dangerous content like child trafficking?
While the case of Cox Communications v. Sony Music is about copyright infringement, the legal principles at stake could have consequences for a wide range of illegal online activity. The central issue is when a service provider can be held responsible for its users' misconduct. Cox argues that unless it actively and purposefully promotes the illegal acts, it cannot be held liable for simply providing a neutral service.
During the hearing, Justice Amy Coney Barrett tested the limits of this argument with a stark hypothetical. She asked Cox's lawyer if, under his legal theory, a platform like Twitter would be liable if it 'knew that a particular account was being used for child trafficking and didn't take it down.' The lawyer conceded that under the principle he was advocating, the platform would not be liable for contributory wrongdoing unless the court carved out a special exception for physical harm.
This exchange revealed the broad, cross-cutting implications of the Court's decision. A ruling that creates a strong shield for internet companies against copyright liability could also make it much harder to hold them accountable for facilitating more severe crimes. The justices are therefore not just deciding the rules for music downloads, but are potentially setting a major precedent for intermediary liability across the entire internet, forcing them to weigh the impact of their decision on a spectrum of harms far beyond the creative economy.
To be found a 'willful' copyright violator and face higher penalties, does a company need to know its own failure to act was illegal, or just that its customers' actions were?
Beyond the primary question of its liability, Cox Communications is challenging the finding that it was a 'willful' violator, which led to much higher statutory damages. Generally, to be found 'willful,' a defendant must know or recklessly disregard the illegality of its own conduct. The jury in the Cox case, however, was instructed that it could find willfulness if Cox simply knew that its subscribers' conduct was illegal.
Cox argues this instruction was a critical error. The company claims it could have genuinely believed it had no legal duty to terminate infringing subscribers, even while knowing that those subscribers were themselves breaking copyright law. Under this view, Cox could not be a 'willful' violator of a duty it didn't believe it had. This position is supported by a previous ruling in the Eighth Circuit, creating a split among lower courts that the Supreme Court was asked to resolve.
Sony Music argues that Cox's conduct, including internal emails showing disregard for copyright law, demonstrated a clear intent to profit from piracy, which is sufficient for a finding of willfulness. The Supreme Court's decision on this point will clarify what it means to willfully break the law in the context of secondary liability. It will determine whether a company can escape heightened penalties by claiming ignorance of its own legal obligations, even when it is fully aware of the illegal activity it is facilitating.