When a private company is sued for work it did for the U.S. government, can it immediately stop the lawsuit to appeal a judge's refusal to dismiss the case?
GEO Group, a private company that ran an immigration detention center for the federal government, is asking the Supreme Court for the right to immediately appeal a trial judge's decision not to dismiss a lawsuit brought by detainees alleging forced labor. In the U.S. legal system, parties typically must wait until a case is completely over and a final judgment is issued before they can appeal. This 'final judgment rule' is designed to prevent litigation from being derailed by constant, piecemeal appeals.
However, GEO Group argues its situation qualifies for a narrow exception called the 'collateral-order doctrine.' This doctrine allows for immediate appeals in specific circumstances where a right is too important to wait, such as a government official's claim of qualified immunity. GEO Group contends that as a government contractor, it possesses a 'derivative sovereign immunity'—a hand-me-down protection from the government itself. They argue this is an 'immunity from suit,' meaning a right not to be forced through a trial at all. If they have to endure a full trial before appealing, they claim this right is irrevocably lost, making a later appeal meaningless.
The detainees suing GEO Group, along with the U.S. government, argue that the company's protection is not a true immunity from suit but merely a strong defense against being found liable. They maintain that the company should have to present its defense at trial like most other defendants and can only appeal if it loses after the case concludes. The Supreme Court must decide whether a contractor's claim of 'just following orders' is so special that it justifies pausing a lawsuit for an immediate appeal, or if it's a standard defense that must wait its turn.
In a lawsuit against a government contractor, what is the legal difference between having an 'immunity from being sued' versus having a 'defense against being found guilty'?
The distinction between an 'immunity from suit' and a 'defense to liability' is the central conflict in the dispute over government contractors' appeal rights. An immunity from suit is a special status that shields a defendant from the entire legal process. It's like a diplomat's immunity; the core idea is that certain individuals or entities should not be burdened by the time, expense, and distraction of a trial in the first place. When a defendant's claim for this type of immunity is denied, courts often allow an immediate appeal because forcing them to go through a trial destroys the very protection the immunity was meant to provide.
In contrast, a defense to liability is an argument that a defendant should not be held responsible for the alleged harm. It is a tool used to win the case at trial, not to avoid the trial itself. The GEO Group, a private company sued for its operation of a federal detention center, argues its claim of following government orders gives it a true immunity from suit. They assert that the point is to avoid the fight altogether, so an appeal after the fight is over comes too late.
Detainees and the U.S. government counter that GEO Group is simply trying to rebrand a powerful defense as a special immunity. They argue the contractor's claim—'we aren't liable because we were following valid federal instructions'—is a classic defense that goes to the heart of who is responsible. As Justice Sonia Sotomayor noted during arguments, the legal principle GEO Group relies on was never historically considered an immunity. This distinction is critical because if it is just a defense, the company has no right to a special, immediate appeal and must proceed with the trial.
A private company claimed it was protecting the U.S. government's interests by seeking to end a lawsuit, but the government argued against the company in court. Why would the government oppose its own contractor?
The U.S. government's decision to argue against its contractor, GEO Group, became a major point of contention at the Supreme Court. Justice Brett Kavanaugh highlighted this apparent contradiction, calling it a 'big hurdle' for the company's case. GEO Group's central argument was that allowing immediate appeals for contractors protects the government from disruption and higher costs. The government's presence on the opposite side severely undermined that claim.
The government's lawyer, Masha Joshi, explained that while the government wants to protect its contractors from unfair liability, it does not believe creating a new category of immediate appeals is the right way to do it. The government argued that the contractor's defense is not a simple, clean legal issue suitable for a quick appeal. Instead, determining whether a contractor was truly and precisely following federal orders is a complex, fact-intensive inquiry that requires digging through contracts, emails, and daily operational details—the very work of a trial court.
Furthermore, the government has a strong interest in maintaining the efficiency of the federal court system. It argued that granting this new right would encourage a flood of premature appeals from thousands of government contractors, delaying justice for plaintiffs and bogging down the courts. In essence, the government's position was that the potential harm to the judicial process from routine, early appeals outweighs the benefit of shielding a contractor from a trial in a specific case. By opposing GEO Group, the government signaled that its interest in orderly litigation was more important than granting its contractors a special procedural escape hatch.
A government contractor claims it can't be sued for forced labor because it was just following federal orders. What is the legal principle behind this defense, and is it strong enough to stop a trial before it starts?
The legal principle behind a 'just following orders' defense for a government contractor comes from a century-old Supreme Court case called Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co. This case established that when a private contractor acts as an agent of the government, follows valid instructions, and the government project itself is authorized by law, the contractor cannot be held liable for damages. The proper target for a lawsuit, in that situation, is the government itself, which has sovereign immunity.
GEO Group, the contractor running an immigration detention center, argues that this Yearsley principle provides more than just a defense to use at trial; it confers a true 'immunity from suit.' They claim that because their actions were legally the government's actions, they should be shielded from the entire litigation process, just as the government is. If a judge refuses to dismiss the case on these grounds, GEO Group believes it should have the right to an immediate appeal to avoid the burdens of a trial altogether.
The core dispute is whether Yearsley actually creates such a powerful, trial-stopping immunity. During oral arguments, multiple justices expressed deep skepticism. Justice Sotomayor stated directly that 'Yearsley was never an immunity case,' but rather a case about 'relief from liability.' Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson echoed this, asking, 'Why isn't Yearsley better understood as a defense than an immunity?' This line of questioning suggests that several justices view the principle as a strong argument for why the contractor should ultimately win the lawsuit, but not as a special ticket to get out of the courtroom before the case is heard on its merits.
If courts allow private government contractors to immediately pause lawsuits against them for appeal, what practical impact could that have on future government projects and civil rights cases?
A ruling in favor of GEO Group, granting government contractors a right to an immediate appeal, would have significant practical consequences. For the thousands of private companies that perform essential government functions—from building infrastructure and defense technology to managing federal programs—it would provide a powerful new legal tool. If sued, a contractor could immediately seek dismissal by claiming it was following government orders. If a trial judge refused, the contractor could pause the entire case, potentially for years, while it pursued an appeal. This could discourage lawsuits, as plaintiffs would face long delays and increased costs before ever getting to the substance of their claims.
Proponents, like GEO Group, argue this is necessary for the government to function effectively. They contend that without this protection, contractors will be hesitant to take on risky but vital public work, or they will charge taxpayers much higher prices to cover the potential for massive litigation expenses. This creates what the company's lawyer called an illogical 'carveout,' where government employees get immunity appeals but the private partners working beside them do not.
Conversely, a loss for GEO Group would maintain the current system, where contractors must typically defend themselves through a full trial before they can appeal a loss. For individuals suing contractors for alleged abuses, such as the detainees in this case, this outcome would ensure they get their day in court without procedural delays. However, it would also mean that contractors continue to face the financial and operational burdens of litigation even when they believe they are blameless, costs that could ultimately be passed on to the government and the public.
Some Supreme Court justices suggested that if government contractors need special protection from lawsuits, Congress should create that protection, not the courts. What does this argument reveal about the role of the judiciary?
During oral arguments, Justice Amy Coney Barrett posed a critical question to GEO Group's lawyer: 'It seems to me like all the arguments you're making... should they be directed to Congress?' This question reflects a judicial philosophy known as judicial restraint, which holds that the role of judges is to interpret the law as it is written, not to create new laws or policies to solve problems, even if the problems are real.
The law at issue, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, simply states that federal appeals courts have jurisdiction over 'final decisions' of trial courts. The 'collateral-order doctrine,' which allows for immediate appeals of certain non-final orders, is a judicial creation. GEO Group was asking the Supreme Court to expand that doctrine to include a new category: denials of derivative sovereign immunity for contractors. Justice Barrett's question suggests she views this as a legislative task. If private contractors are so essential to government operations that they need a special right to interrupt trials for an appeal, Congress is the body responsible for weighing the policy pros and cons and writing that rule into the statute.
This perspective provides an 'off-ramp' for the Court to rule against GEO Group without ever deciding the underlying question of whether the company's defense is a true immunity. The justices could simply conclude that they lack the authority to create the procedural protection the company seeks. This approach avoids judicial policymaking and places the responsibility squarely on the legislative branch to decide if the practical needs of government contracting warrant changing the long-standing rules of federal litigation.