Bost v. IL Bd. of Elections

A federal candidate in Illinois, Mike Bost, asked the Supreme Court to rule that he has the right to challenge a state law allowing mail-in ballots to be counted for fourteen days after the federally set Election Day. To sue in federal court, a person must show a concrete injury, a requirement known as “standing.” The core dispute is whether simply being a candidate in a race with altered rules is injury enough.

Illinois argued that because Bost was expected to win his election easily, he faced no “substantial risk” of harm from the ballot-counting extension. Therefore, his lawsuit was just an abstract political grievance, not a genuine legal dispute. Justice Sotomayor tested this idea, asking if a candidate in a district that is 98% Republican would still have standing to sue, suggesting that allowing such lawsuits would open the courthouse doors to competitors with no real stake in the outcome.

Bost’s lawyers countered that changing the rules harms every competitor, regardless of who is favored to win. Justice Alito captured this argument with a powerful analogy, asking if any of eight Olympic sprinters would have a valid injury if they arrived for a 100-meter dash and were suddenly told to run 105 meters. The implication is that the injury isn't about losing, but about the fundamental unfairness of changing the competition itself. The Court must decide whether to require proof of a likely loss, which Chief Justice Roberts feared would turn judges into “political oddsmakers,” or to allow any candidate to sue, potentially flooding courts with political disputes.

The legal team for candidate Mike Bost argued that an Illinois law extending the ballot-counting period by two weeks inflicted a direct “pocketbook injury” on his campaign. To avoid what they termed “political malpractice,” the campaign was forced to spend money paying staff, lawyers, and volunteers to monitor the prolonged counting process. They contended this extra, unavoidable expense was a concrete financial harm caused directly by the state’s rule, thereby giving him the right to sue.

The State of Illinois countered that this was a self-inflicted wound, not a legally recognized injury. The state's lawyer argued that a person cannot create standing to sue just by choosing to spend money to guard against a speculative threat. Since Bost was not in substantial danger of losing the election, Illinois claimed the money was spent fighting a phantom menace. The state’s argument is akin to saying you can't sue the weather channel for the cost of an umbrella you bought on a sunny day just because they mentioned a 1% chance of rain.

The justices must resolve whether any expense caused by an election law is enough to create standing, or if the money must be spent to prevent a separate, legally recognized harm, such as a credible risk of losing the election. A ruling for the candidate could allow campaigns to challenge a wide range of administrative rules by claiming they add to operational costs.

A candidate for federal office in Illinois, Mike Bost, argued that even if he won his race, he could still be legally harmed by the state's extended ballot-counting period. His lawyers claimed that by counting what they considered to be unlawful ballots arriving after Election Day, the state's law could shrink his margin of victory. This, they asserted, was a concrete injury because a larger victory provides a stronger political mandate, makes fundraising easier, and can discourage future challengers from running against him.

This argument met with direct skepticism from the bench. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson bluntly dismissed the idea, telling the candidate's lawyer that “harm is what you need in order to establish standing, not preference for 60 percent or 59 percent or whatever.” Her comment framed the desire for a larger win as a political preference rather than a tangible, legally protectable injury.

The State of Illinois similarly rejected the claim, characterizing it as a candidate wanting to “run up the score.” The state’s position is that a win is a win, and the court's role is not to protect a politician's preferred electoral narrative or political capital. The Supreme Court's decision on this point will help clarify the definition of “injury,” determining whether it is strictly limited to the ultimate outcome of an election or if it can include other real-world political consequences.

The state of Illinois argued that a candidate should only be allowed to sue over an election law if they can first prove there is a “substantial risk” they might lose the election because of that law. This proposal raised immediate alarm bells for several justices, who worried about its practical consequences for the judiciary.

Chief Justice John Roberts described this standard as a “potential disaster.” He reasoned that it would force federal judges, right before an election, to evaluate polls and political forecasts to determine if a race was “close enough” to permit a lawsuit. This would improperly inject the courts into the business of political prediction, undermining their role as impartial arbiters of law. The candidate’s attorney drove this point home with a memorable soundbite, warning that the state's rule would turn the judiciary into the “Article III equivalent of the Cook Report,” a well-known political newsletter that forecasts election outcomes.

The alternative, argued by the candidate, is to let any candidate challenge the rules before the race begins, allowing for orderly legal resolution. However, the state warned this would swamp courts with lawsuits from candidates who have no chance of winning. The justices are therefore caught between two undesirable scenarios: either turning judges into political pundits or potentially opening the floodgates to any candidate who disagrees with an election rule.

At the heart of a dispute over Illinois's election laws is whether candidates for office are fundamentally different from ordinary citizens when it comes to filing a lawsuit. The candidate, Mike Bost, argued that as a direct competitor in the election, any change to the rules inherently harms him, giving him an automatic right, or “standing,” to sue. This position suggests there should be a special exception for candidates, recognizing their unique and personal stake in the integrity of their own election.

Several justices appeared highly skeptical of creating such a carve-out. Justice Elena Kagan framed the candidate's argument as an attempt to create a special rule where “if a candidate is there before the court, the candidate has good reasons for being there.” She then pointedly stated, “for the most part, I think we have rejected that view of standing.” This suggests that the Court's precedent leans against treating certain classes of people differently when it comes to accessing the courts.

The State of Illinois argued that the same rules must apply to everyone. To get into federal court, any person—candidate or not—must demonstrate a concrete and particularized injury. Simply being a candidate, the state contended, does not grant a free pass to challenge any election law one dislikes. The Court's decision will have significant implications for the constitutional doctrine of standing and could either reinforce the universal requirements for lawsuits or create a new, candidate-specific exception.

A central argument from a candidate challenging Illinois's election law was that any change to the rules of a competition is an inherent injury to all competitors. Justice Samuel Alito illustrated this with an analogy: if sprinters show up for a 100-meter dash and are told it is now 105 meters, they are all harmed by the rule change itself, regardless of who ultimately wins. This theory suggests that the act of altering the electoral process is, on its own, a sufficient harm to justify a lawsuit.

However, this broad theory raised concerns about its logical limits. Justice Neil Gorsuch tested the idea by posing a hypothetical: what if a state changed the rules to require ballots be printed on “cream paper” instead of white paper? He then asked, “Then it's harder to see an injury, right?” His question highlighted a critical problem: if any rule change constitutes an injury, courts could be flooded with lawsuits over trivial administrative adjustments that have no meaningful impact on an election's outcome.

This exchange reveals the Court’s search for a “limiting principle.” If the justices agree that some rule changes create an automatic injury, they must find a way to distinguish significant alterations, like extending vote-counting by 14 days, from insignificant ones, like the color of ballot paper. Crafting a clear legal standard that separates fundamental changes from minor administrative tweaks is one of the most difficult challenges the Court faces in this case.